Deleting e-mails sent by the supervisor

Deleting e-mails sent by the supervisor

OATH Index No. 2553/14

The appointing authority filed disciplinary charges against an employee charging the individual with having deleted 27 of the 29 of the e-mails sent by her supervisor without having read them and disobeying an order not to delete e-mails transmitted by the supervisor.

Testimony presented at the hearing included a statement by the employee’s supervisor that he had “received via e-mail notices that [the employee] had deleted without reading … e-mails on which he had copied [the individual].

OATH Administrative Law Judge Astrid B. Gloade found that misconduct was not proven and recommended dismissal of the charges as the evidence in the record did not establish that the employee was given an order to retain the e-mails. Further, explained the ALJ, the appointing authority “failed to prove that even if [the employee] had deleted the e-mails it would have constituted misconduct. Misconduct may be premised on carelessness or negligence, as well as willful or intentional conduct.”

In the words of the Administrative Law Judge: “I find that [the employer] failed to establish by a preponderance of the evidence that [employee] committed misconduct and recommend that the charges be dismissed.”

Among Judge Gloade's finding: 27 of the 29 of the emails were deleted on a Sunday morning and that the appointing authority failed to present any evidence that the employee was at work, or had remotely accessed her e-mail account, at that time.

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://archive.citylaw.org/wp-content/uploads/sites/17/oath/14_Cases/14-2553.pdf
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New York State's Veterans Employment Act .

New York State's Veterans Employment Act

Source: NYS Department of Civil Service

The New York State Department of Civil Service has distributed General Information Bulletin No. 14-04 to State Department and Agency Directors of Personnel and Affirmative Action Officers.  Bulletin 14-04 states advises::

“On January 20, 2014 the Executive Law was amended to add Chapter 17-A, also known as the Veterans Employment Act. Pursuant to Section 369 of the Executive Law, it will be the policy of the state to use eligible discharged veterans for temporary appointments in state agencies rather than utilizing temporary employment service companies.

“To this end, it will be the responsibility of the Department of Civil Service to create and maintain a veteran temporary hiring list. The law requires a state agency to select a veteran from the veteran temporary hiring list when making a temporary appointment, provided that the veteran possesses the applicable skills needed for the temporary assignment.”

Veteran Eligibility

“In order to be eligible to participate in the Veterans Temporary Hiring Program an individual must have served on active duty in the United States Army, Navy, Marine Corps, Air Force, Coast Guard or the Reserve Components of the Armed Forces of the United States or served in active military service of the United States as a member of the Army National Guard, Air National Guard, New York Guard or New York Naval Militia, and have been released from such service otherwise than by dishonorable discharge after September 11, 2001.

“We expect that jobseekers will upload their federal form DD-214 (Military Service Record) in the portal and agencies will use this information to verify their eligibility for participation in the program.”

Temporary Appointments

“A state agency must select a qualified veteran from the Veteran Temporary Hiring Program portal when making a temporary appointment to a temporary-hourly budgeted position, provided the veteran possesses the applicable skills needed for the temporary assignment. A qualified veteran willing to accept the position must be selected prior to making an appointment of a non-veteran.”

Additional information is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.cs.ny.gov/ssd/Manuals/SPMM/GIBS/GIB14-04.cfm
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Recent ruling by the Appellate Division concerning alleged unlawful discrimination

Recent ruling by the Appellate Division concerning alleged unlawful discrimination

Browne v Board of Educ, 2014 NY Slip Op 07465, Appellate Division, Second Department

Matter of Katz (Commissioner of Labor), 2014 NY Slip Op 07556, Appellate Division, Third Department

The Browne decision:

This decision by the Appellate Division illustrates the shifting of a party’s “burden of going forward” in litigating a complaint alleging unlawful discrimination.

Robert Browne attempted to recover damages for alleged employment discrimination on the basis of gender in violation of Executive Law §296.

The New York City Board of Education [Department] appalled so much of an order of the Supreme Court that denied its motion for summary judgment dismissing the cause of action in which Browne alleged employment discrimination based on gender.

The Appellate Division affirmed the lower court’s ruling explaining that Browne, in opposing the Board’s “prima facie showing that there was a legitimate, raised a triable issue of fact as to whether the Department’s explanation was false, misleading, or incomplete, and thus, a pretext for discrimination.

Accordingly, said the court, the Supreme Court properly denied that branch of the Department’s motion for summary judgment dismissing Browne’s first cause of action, which alleged employment discrimination based on gender.

The Appellate Division also noted that the Department, by failing to raise collateral estoppel as an affirmative defense to Browne’s cause of action alleging employment discrimination either in its pre-answer motion to dismiss or in its answer, waived it, citing CPLR §3211[a][5],[e].

The Katz decision:

The Katz decision by the Appellate Division demonstrates a difficulty that resulted from an individual submitting his or her resignation from the position based on what the court characterized as the employee's “perceived  religious harassment” without first giving the employer an opportunity to investigate the matter.

Roberta B. Katzbegan working for an organization that provides vocational services for persons with disabilities and was being trained to assume the position of director of accounting.

Prior to accepting the job, Katz received the employer's assurance that her religious practices would be accommodated permitting her to leave work at 2:45 p.m. on Friday, December 7, 2012. Her trainer scheduled a meeting on that date from 2:00 p.m. until 3:00 p.m., but told claimant that she could leave at 2:45 p.m. At 2:40 p.m. the trainer told Katz that she needed her to prepare a computer-generated report.

Katz told the trainer she could not complete the report within five minutes and the trainer agreed to prepare it herself. The trainer then asked Katz to log on to her computer to get a password the trainer needed to do the report. At 2:50 p.m. the trainer told Katz to leave.

Katz did not report to work the following Monday, but resigned from her position due to what she perceived was religious harassment.

Katz applied for unemployment insurance benefits and ultimately the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board ruled that she was disqualified from receiving such benefits because she had voluntarily left her employment without good cause. Katz appealed the Board's ruling.

The Appellate Division affirmed the Board’s determination explaining regardless of the  “inappropriateness of the trainer's actions,” Katz resigned from her position without affording the employer an opportunity to investigate the matter or take corrective action.

Noting that Katz had emailed the employer announcing her resignation the Sunday after the incident and before she even discussed it with the employer's human resources manager, the court ruled that under these circumstances substantial evidence supported the Board's finding that Katz had voluntarily left her employment without good cause.

The Browne decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_07465.htm

The Katz decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_07556.htm

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board is bound by the disciplinary arbitrator's factual findings regarding the employee’s misconduct

The Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board held bound by the disciplinary arbitrator's factual findings regarding the employee’s misconduct 

2014 NY Slip Op 07414, Appellate Division, Third Department

A NYC Transit Authority [Authority] train operator [Operator] was served with disciplinary charges. Following a full evidentiary arbitration hearing conducted under the collective bargaining agreement, Operator was terminated.

Operator applied for unemployment insurance benefits and the Unemployment Insurance Appeal Board, noting that it was bound by the factual findings of the arbitrator, conducted an "independent evaluation” as to whether Operator’s behavior constituted disqualifying misconduct for the purposes of unemployment insurance.

The Board, however, found that Operator’s behavior leading to the Authority’s filing disciplinary charges did not constitute “disqualifying misconduct” within the meaning of the Unemployment Insurance Law and approved his claim for unemployment insurance benefits.

The Appellate Division reversed the Board’s determination.

The court explained that "While the Board was free to make 'independent additional factual findings' and draw its own independent conclusion as to whether [Operator’s] behavior rose to the level of disqualifying misconduct for purposes of entitlement to unemployment insurance benefits, it was also bound by the [arbitrator's] 'factual findings regarding [Operator’s] conduct and [her] conclusion' that claimant had" committed serious violations of safety rules.

In this instance the arbitrator found that Operator had committed “grave violations of the employer's policies that had endangered the safety of his passengers, violations that were rendered even more egregious by the fact that he had previously been disciplined for similar conduct.”

In contrast, said the court, the Board “inexplicably found that [Operator] had ‘substantially complied with’ the [Authority’s] policies and made no effort to consider [Operator’s] behavior within the context of his prior disciplinary history."

Accordingly the Appellate Division ruled that the Board improperly contradicted factual findings of the arbitrator and remitted the matter to the Board for it to "reconsider upon appropriate findings."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_07414.htm
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If a settlement or award includes a payment only the part constituting reimbursement for lost wages is included in determining the employee’s retirement allowance

If a settlement or award includes a payment only the part constituting reimbursement for lost wages is included in determining the employee’s retirement allowance
2014 NY Slip Op 07412, Appellate Division, Third Department

In 2006 a grievance brought by the union on behalf of a teacher [Teacher] who was not selected for a coaching position was settled with the school district. The settlement included a payment in the amount of $9,500 for “lost wages” as the result of Teacher not being given a coaching position.

This 2006 settlement award was included in the calculation of Teacher's final average salary for retirement purposes by the New York State Teachers' Retirement System [TRS].

Teacher was not appointed to a coaching position for either of the next two school years.  The union again filed a grievance on behalf of Teacher and again the matter was settled. A 2011 settlement “memorandum of understanding [MOU]” provided for an awarded of $11,220.* This amount constituted the stipends that Teacher would have been paid had he been appointed to a coaching position for both school years.

Teacher then asked TRS to recalculate his three-year final average salary to include the 2011 settlement payment provided by the MOU and to adjust his retirement allowance accordingly. TRS determined that because the payment provided pursuant to the 2011 MOU was not part of Teacher‘s regular compensation it could not be included in the final computation of his retirement benefit.

Teacher sued TRS seeking a court order annulling its decision, arguing that TRS’s decision was arbitrary and capricious in light of its previous inclusion of the 2006 settlement payment in its computation of his final average salary.

Supreme Court dismissed Teacher’s petition and he appealed that ruling to the Appellate Division.

The Appellate Division noted that a TRS member's final average salary is based on his or her highest average annual regular salary that was earned over any three consecutive years of service prior to retirement but shall exclude, among other things, "payments which are not part of the salary base."

TRS had explained that it had included the payment made to Teacher pursuant to the 2006 stipulation as the MOU reflected an acknowledgment by the school district that it had violated an existing collective bargaining agreement when it denied Teacher's coaching application on the ground that he was unqualified and gave the positions to teachers with less seniority. In addition, the 2006 settlement confirm that Teacher was indeed eligible to assume the coaching positions.

However, TRS pointed out that the 2011 MOU settling Teacher's subsequent grievances “did not concede, in any manner, that the denial of Teacher ‘s coaching applications for the 2005-2006 and 2006-2007 school years had resulted in any contractual violations….” In fact, said TRS, the 2011 MOU reiterated the school district's assertion that Teacher "was unqualified for the coaching position at issue."

The Appellate Division said that the fact that the school district opted to pay Teacher in exchange for a complete settlement of his claims against it does not create a basis to find that Teacher was eligible for the coaching appointments. Accordingly, the court found that the MOU settlement payment did not constituted compensation that Teacher would have earned and thus TRS was correct in excluding the 2011 settlement payment in its calculation of Teacher’s final average salary.

Finding that TRS’s determination, which was rendered without a hearing, was rational and not arbitrary and capricious, the Appellate Division declined to disturbed it.

* The Appellate Division observed that “Although the MOU states that the $11,220 settlement amount constitutes the stipends of $5,605 that Teacher would have been paid if appointed to a coaching position during each of the two school years for which he applied, the annual stipend amounts actually total $11,210.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_07412.htm

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Removal of a public officer from his or her office

Removal of a public officer from his or her office

Kalodukas v Berentsen, 2014 NY Slip Op 07406, Appellate Division, Third Department

Glenda Kalodukas and other citizen residents of the Village of Bloomingburg in Sullivan County [Kalodukas], filed a petition in the Appellate Division pursuant to Public Officers Law §36* seeking to have the Appellate Division remove Mark Berentsen from his position of Mayor of the Village, alleging, among other things, that he violated General Municipal Law Article 18.**

Berentsen asked the court to dismiss the petition arguing, among other things, that the proceeding was moot in view of the fact that he was unsuccessful in his bid for reelection and no longer held the office of Mayor. The Appellate Division agreed and dismissed Kalodukas’ petition.

The court explained §36 of the Public Officers Law provides, as relevant in this action, that a village officer may be removed from office for "misconduct, maladministration, malfeasance or malversation in office." As Berentsen had lost his bid for reelection and no longer helds the public office from which Kalodukas sought to have him removed, the Appellate Division said that “the proceeding is undoubtedly moot.” 

In addition, the court addressed Kalodukas’ argument that the petition was not moot because Berentsen’s removal would prevent him from holding public office in the future. The Appellate Division, in a footnote, said that findings against an official in a removal proceeding pursuant to §36 of the Public Officers Law would not a bar his or her subsequent election to public office.***

* Such an application for removal may be made to the appellate division by any citizen resident of such town, village, improvement district or fire district, or by the district attorney of the county, in which such town, village or district is located. The officer is to given at least eight days notice and a copy of the charge[s] upon which the application will be made must be served with such notice.

** Article 18 is captioned “Conflicts of Interest of Municipal Officers and Employees”

*** In contrast, the court noted that Article VI, § 22 [h] of the State Constitution “A judge or justice removed by the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals shall be ineligible to hold other judicial office."

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_07406.htm

 __________________

The Discipline Book, - A concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public employees in New York State set out in a 2100+ page e-book. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/5215.html

 __________________

Reporting compensation and reimbursement for expenses paid to election workers

Reporting compensation and reimbursement for expenses paid to election workers

Source: Internal Revenue Service bulletin

Election workers are individuals hired by government entities to perform services at polling places in connection with national, state and local elections.

An election worker may be referred to by other terms and titles, for example, poll worker, moderator, machine tender, checker, ballot clerk, voting official, polling place manager, absentee ballot counter or deputy head moderator. These workers may be employed by the government entity exclusively for election work, or may work in other capacities as well.

Election worker compensation is includible in income and may be treated as wages for social security and Medicare (FICA) tax purposes.

Election workers may be compensated by a set fee per day or a stipend for the election period. The election period may include attending training or meetings prior to and after the election. 

Election workers may also be reimbursed for their mileage or other expenses. To be excludable from wages, expense reimbursements must be made under an accountable plan.

For additional information, go to http://www.irs.gov/Government-Entities/Federal,-State-&-Local-Governments/Election-Workers-Reporting-and-Withholding

A written administrative employee evaluation that is not disciplinary in nature may be placed in an employees personnel file by the employer

A written administrative employee evaluation that is not disciplinary in nature may be placed in an employees personnel file by the employer
2014 NY Slip Op 07360, Appellate Division, Second Department

A tenured teacher [Teacher] filed a CPLR Article 78 petition seeking a court order directing the school district to remove a certain letter from Teacher's personnel file. Supreme Court dismissed Teacher’s petition and on appeal the Appellate Division sustained the lower court’s action.

The Appellate Division explained that the letter Teacher sought to have removed from his personnel file "[fell] within [the] permissible range of administrative evaluation," and the school district did not act unlawfully in making it part of Teacher's personnel file without first complying with the disciplinary procedural requirements set out in Education Law §3020-a. Although in New York a tenured teacher may not be "disciplined" without he or she being afforded the protections set out in Education Law §3020-a, a critical "administrative evaluation" may properly be included in a teacher's personnel file without the appointing authority first having to comply with the administrative due process requirements set out in §3020-a.

As to what falls within the ambit of “the permissible range of administrative evaluation," in Holt v Board of Education, 52 NY2d 625, the Court of Appeals ruled that performance evaluations and letters of criticism placed in the employee’s personnel file were not “disciplinary penalties” and thus could be placed there without having to first hold a disciplinary proceeding.

The basic rule set out in Holt is that a statutory disciplinary provision such as §75 of the Civil Service Law does not require that an employee be given a hearing or permitted to grieve every comment or statement by his or her employer that he or she may consider a criticism.

In contrast, in D'Angelo v Scoppetta, 19 NY3d 663, the Court of Appeals found that a letter placed in an employee's file indicating “serious misconduct” that could negatively impact his or her eligibility for a future promotion goes beyond “constructive criticism.” In other words, a writing claimed to constitute “constructive criticism” may not be used to frustrate an employee’s right to due process as set out in §75 of the Civil Service Law, §3020-a of the Education Law or a contract disciplinary procedure.

What distinguishes lawful “constructive criticism” of an individual’s performance by a supervisor and supervisory actions addressing an individual’s performance that are disciplinary in nature? Comments critical of employee performance do not, without more, constitute disciplinary action. On the other hand, counseling letters may not be used as a subterfuge for avoiding initiating formal disciplinary action against a tenured individual.The decisions of the Commissioner of Education in Fusco v Jefferson County School District, CEd, 14,396, and Irving v Troy City School District, CEd 14,373, are instructive in this regard.

In both the Fusco and Irving cases the Commissioner of Education found that the alleged “critical comment” filed in the respective personnel file of these employees exceeded the parameters circumscribing “lawful instruction” seeking to correct unacceptable performance.

In Fusco’s case, the Commissioner said that the “contents of the memorandum” did not fall within the parameters of a “permissible evaluation” despite the school board’s claim that the memorandum was “intended to encourage positive change” in Fusco’s performance. The Commissioner noted that the memorandum "contains no constructive criticism or a single suggestion for improvement." Rather, said the Commissioner, the memorandum focused on “castigating [Fusco] for prior alleged misconduct."

In Irving’s case, a school principal was given a letter critical of her performance and the next day reassigned to another school where she was to serve as an assistant principal. The Commissioner ruled that these two actions, when considered as a single event, constituted disciplinary action within the meaning of §3020-a of the Education Law."

 .

The Teacher decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_07360.htm

_________________

The Discipline Book, - A concise guide to disciplinary actions involving public employees in New York State set out in a 2100+ page e-book. 
For more information click on http://booklocker.com/book/5215.html 

________________

Using the services of a private entity to select and provide qualified medical personnel to conduct medical examination required by Civil Service Law §72.1

Using the services of a private entity to select and provide qualified medical personnel to conduct medical examination required by Civil Service Law §72.1

Agency v Anonymous, OATH Index #866/14  

Civil Service Law §72.1, in pertinent part, provides: “When in the judgment of an appointing authority an employee is unable to perform the duties of his or her position by reason of a disability, other than a disability resulting from occupational injury or disease as defined in the workers' compensation law, the appointing authority may require such employee to undergo a medical examination to be conducted by a medical officer selected by the civil service department or municipal commission having jurisdiction.”

In the course of a hearing brought pursuant to §72 of the Civil Service Law,* Anonymous contended that the statutory requirement providing for the selection of the physicians who were to examine her was violated because she was examined by doctors who were selected by a private entity, JurisSolutions,** and not by physicians selected by the Department of Citywide Administrative Services (DCAS).

OATH Administrative Law Judge Kevin A. Casey found that the controlling provisions of the Civil Service Law were complied with, holding that DCAS’s delegation of the task of recruiting qualified medical specialists to perform §72 fitness-for-duty examinations to JurisSolutions did not constitute an unlawful delegation of its statutory authority.

Judge Casey found that while JurisSolutions employed the physicians who examined Anonymous, DCAS maintained control over the process by specifying minimum criteria for each specialty and retaining, in its the sole discretion, the authority to reject a doctor named by JurisSolutions to conduct the examination.*** Accordingly, said the ALJ, DCAS “did not unlawfully delegate its authority by contracting with a vendor to provide qualified, independent doctors to perform fit-for-duty examinations.”

Further, the ALJ found that Anonymous failed to show prejudice on the part of the independent and well qualified physicians who examined her..

Judge Casey's findings and recommendation were adopted by the appointing authority.

* Civil Service Law §72.1 provides that “An employee shall be allowed ten working   days from service of the notice to object to the imposition of the   proposed leave of absence and to request a hearing.

** JurisSolutions is a vendor selected by the New York Department of Citywide Administrative Services to provide qualified medical personnel in designated specialties “to conduct fitness-for-duty examinations.”

*** DCAS's delegation of its administrative authority appears to comply with the guidelines set out by the U.S. Supreme Court in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States, 295 U.S. 495, in addressing the delegation of legislative powers by Congress.
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Collective bargaining agreement determined to have clearly and unambiguously barred the arbitration of grievances involving layoff

Collective bargaining agreement determined to have clearly and unambiguously barred the arbitration of grievances involving layoff

Matter of the Arbitration between Hudson Val. Community Coll. and Hudson Val. Community Coll. Faculty Assn., 2014 NY Slip Op 07240, Appellate Division, Third Department

Christine Raneri, a part-time adjunct professor employed by the Hudson Valley Community College (HVCC), was appointed as a full-time probationary teacher by the College in 2007. In March 2012, HVCC notified Raneri that “her position had been retrenched,” and that her employment would end in August 2012.

The Hudson Valley Community College Faculty Association [Association] submitted a grievance on Raneri's behalf challenging HVCC's decision to retrenchment her from the position. HVCC's president denied the grievance following a hearing and the Association served a demand for arbitration on the college.

HVCC and the County of Rensselaer commenced an Article 75 CPLR action seeking a permanent stay of arbitration [proceeding No. 1]. The Association answered and then cross-petitioned to compel arbitration. The Association also initiated an Article 78 action, proceeding No. 2 against the County, the Board of Trustees of HVCC and others challenging Raneri's retrenchment on the merits. HVCC moved to dismiss the CPLR Article 78 petition.

Supreme Court granted HVCC’s petition in proceeding No. 1, permanently staying arbitration, denied the Association’s cross petition in proceeding No. 1 to compel arbitration, and dismissed the Association’s CPLR Article 78 proceeding (proceeding No. 2).

In its appeal from Supreme Court's ruling concerning proceeding No. 1 the Association contended that Supreme Court erred in determining that the issue of retrenchment was excluded from arbitration by the terms of the CBA and thus was incorrect in permanently staying the arbitration.

The Appellate Division disagreed with the Association’s claim, holding that the sole issue before Supreme Court was whether the CBA reveals that the parties agreed to arbitrate this grievance. Noting that the CBA provides that grievances — defined as claims "based upon the interpretation or application of" the CBA — are generally subject to arbitration, the court pointed out that the controlling CBA also provided that "[m]atters relating to [HVCC's] decision to retrench, fill, refill, establish and/or re-establish bargaining unit positions shall not be arbitrable hereunder”. The CBA further provided that if such a staffing issue is grieved, “the decision of the [HVCC] President or designee shall be final and binding and shall constitute the exclusive remedy thereunder."

The Appellate Division, agreeing with Supreme Court, said that this language clearly and “unambiguously manifests the parties' intention to exclude the subject matter of retrenchment from arbitration.”

Turning to the Association’s challenge to the Supreme Court’s dismissal of its Article 78 petition, the Appellate Division said that in reviewing such a claim, a court may not substitute its judgment for that of the administrative body and must confirm the challenged determination unless the body "acted in excess of [its] jurisdiction, in violation of lawful procedure, arbitrarily, or in abuse of [its] discretionary power," citing Pell v Board of Educ, 34 NY2d 222.

The court rejected the Association’s argument that the reason given by HVCC to Raneri for the retrenchment — the discontinuance of a particular program — was pretextual.

Although the Association contended that minutes from a curriculum committee meeting held in the same month as the retrenchment revealed that the faculty was advised that the discontinuance would have no impact on student numbers or faculty hours, the Appellate Division noted that affidavits in the record also reveal that, for economic reasons, HVCC was reducing the number of sections in Raneri's teaching area at the time in question and increasing the number of students in each section.

The Association also claimed that the retrenchment violated the CBA in that the positions of two faculty members in Raneri's teaching area who had less seniority "were not retrenched." The court said that the record showed that both of these instructors were ASE-certified and were scheduled to teach a full load of courses for which this certification was required — and which Raneri, not being ASE-certified, could not teach — in the fall of academic 2012.

Thus, the Appellate Division concluded, "the retrenchment of Raneri's position" was in conformity with a requirement in the CBA that such actions "shall be made in inverse order of seniority provided a faculty member has the qualifications to teach the courses to be taught" (emphasis in the decision)^.*

Regarding the Association’s claim that an incumbent serving in an adjunct faculty should be laid off first, the court noted that the adjunct faculty member also possessed ASE certification and taught classes for which such certification was required; thus, retrenching his position would not have prevented Raneri's being laid off

As the record revealed that assignments were made for legitimate reasons having to do with the instructors' qualifications and other responsibilities, the Appellate Division said that “Supreme Court did not err in determining that HVCC's decision was not arbitrary or capricious, an abuse of discretion or in violation of lawful procedure.”

* The Appellate Division said that it agreed with Supreme Court's view that “this provision requires a faculty member to be qualified to teach upcoming classes, rather than those for which the faculty member's qualifications may have sufficed in previous years.”

The decision is posted on the Internet at:

http://www.nycourts.gov/reporter/3dseries/2014/2014_07240.htm

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The Layoff, Preferred List and Reinstatement Manual - a 645 page e-book reviewing the relevant laws, rules and regulations, and selected court and administrative decisions. For more information click on http://booklocker.com/books/5216.html

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